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The Islamic ‘revival’ in the Balkans has raised many questions among mainstream politicians and 
academics, who tend to look at religion as a repository of ethno-national identities, and hence a risky 
‘depot’, furthering divisions between and among national entities. How believers themselves discover, 
articulate and experience their faith, is often lost in the grand narratives of nations’ assumed 
uniformity and the related criteria of inclusion and exclusion. This article shifts the analytical focus 
from nation-centric debates on the revival of Islam to believers’ personalized discovery, practice and 
pursuit of faith since the fall of Communism. The analysis suggests a bifurcation between state 
authorities and centralized Islamic hierarchies that view Islam as an important marker of identity on 
the one hand, and emerging faith communities that rely upon alternative sources of knowledge and 
authority on the other. All the while, the Islamic phenomenon is no longer only the bearer of ethno-
national alternatives, but also the symptom of new spaces that blend a variety of new actors as well as 
overlapping national, regional and global processes. 
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Introduction* 
The post-Communist resurgence of Islam across the Balkans has raised many questions, which are still 
exclusively studied within the context of the rise of nationalism and the violent conflicts of the early 
1990s. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the ferocity of conflicts and violence, moreover, 
have confined research to the most striking cases and particular moments in time (Poulton and Taji-
Farouki 1997, 1). Consequently, the exploration of the Islamic phenomena is left to the mercy of 
nationalist and post-conflict paradigms, which necessarily essentialize the revival of Islam according 
to the ethno-national divisions of the day (Henig and Bielenin-Lenczowska 2013). However, the 
liberalization of religious conduct, and the normalization of the political arena in the two decades since 
the fall of Communism has unleashed a myriad of new encounters between believers and nationally 
envisaged religious categories and roles. In the ‘opened up’ religious market, believers face different 
sources of knowledge and information, and are more apt to choose, replicate, but also resist and recast 
the collective ethno-national divisions within which they maneuver.  
This article delves into the emerging gap between ethno-national classificatory categories that 
constitute the organized religious fields and Muslim believers’ own discovery and formulations of 
faith in the open market of religiosity that characterized the post-Communist era. Who are the actors 
that speak for Islam? What are the frames of the national religious ‘field’ and the categories upon 
which it builds? How do believers navigate those categories and choose what it is to be a good Muslim 
and how to pursue it in the open market of religiosity? What are the alternative pathways to God in the 
reconfigured relationship between nation, state, and faith in the post-Communist Balkans?  
We approach these questions by critically exploring the mechanisms that sustain the state-
organized religious field, and shifting the analytical focus to the disruptions of national categories and 
believers’ self-discovery of faith within the liberalized religious spaces. This analytical angle permits 
us to analyze the revival of Islam at the intersection of the political and the sacred, blending a variety 
of national, regional and global processes, as well as continuities and ruptures in the post-Communist 
resurgence of faith.  
The article proceeds in four sections. Section One unpacks mainstream research, which considers 
religion, and particularly Islam, as a marker of ethno-national communal identities. Section Two 
outlines the actors and mechanisms that sustain the state organized religious field and its ideological 
pillars. Section Three investigates contemporary ‘breaks’ that challenge the official religious sphere 
and provide believers with new alternatives, opportunities and ideas to pursue their faith. Section Four 
analyzes the diffraction of Islam into different actors with different alternatives concerning the revival 
of faith: State authorities and official Islamic institutions that frame religion in the name of the nation 
on the one hand, and autonomous faith communities that assemble around informal structures and 
alternative sources of knowledge and authority on the other.  
The findings presented herein suggest that Islam, as framed at the top-down political level, remains 
an important marker of identities, but that experiences of religiosity have increasingly become more 
personalized and individual in nature, detached from organized religion and official doctrinal 
prescriptions. Believers’ expressions and practices of Islam after the fall of Communism are 
increasingly personal, mobile, weakly institutionalized, and collective mostly as a choice. This ‘de-
nationalization’ and ‘de-ethnization’ of Islam does not necessarily entail a ‘de-culturation,’ but a 
recasting of the connection between religious, cultural and political markers. The result is the revival 
of Islam as a mere religion, not as a collective identity or organized structure of ‘belonging’. At a more 
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general level, this analysis of Islamic revival in the Balkans contributes to exploring timely and 
pertinent questions on the actors that speak for Islam, the role of foreign influences, the relationship 
between nation, state and faith, post-Communist patterns of religiosity, as well as traits of Islam in the 
broader European context.  
Islam as a National/Ethnic Marker  
Mainstream research on Islam in the Balkans, similarly to that concerning other denominations, is 
permeated by an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption that religion serves to shape and 
demarcate national/ethnic boundaries. Religion in general is reduced to an ‘ethnic marker’, a crucial 
and yet divisive source of national identity. As Creed notes, the scholarly privileging of ethno-national 
identities, at the expense of local identities and localized forms of knowledge and practice, represents 
an ‘example of Balkanism par excellence’ (2011, 168). Insistence upon the role of religion in 
confining communal identities is particularly related to the march of national ideologies and the 
vicissitudes of state- and nation-building processes along a historical course of imbroglio and conflict 
between diverse ethnic and religious groups in these parts of the world. 
The enmeshment, and often subjugation, of religion to politics of national identity became 
especially pronounced during the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. The political entities that resulted 
from the dissolution of the federal state structure all claimed to represent a dominant ethnic group 
identified with a specific religion, by effectively managing a transformation process that Verdery has 
called the ‘extermination of alternative identity choices’ (1994, 38). However, it was the appalling 
bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina that brought world-wide attention to Muslim populations, their 
ethnic allegiances and nation- and state-formation processes in Southeastern Europe. As Poulton and 
Taji-Farouki put it, ‘the Bosnian tragedy has made very clear the importance of examining the 
relationship between the Balkan Muslim communities and the states in which they live’ (1997, 1). 
Then came Kosovo, another case of political conflict that developed along ethno-religious lines, 
namely between Muslim Albanians and Orthodox Serbs. Subsequently, conflicts in Macedonia drew 
new attention to divisions between Orthodox Macedonians and Muslim Albanians, both barricading 
themselves into opposing ‘ethno-religious’ fronts. The battles for state authority, power, territory, and 
independent statehood in the 1990s, all made use of religious symbols as crucial instruments for the 
reconstruction of the national ‘self’ against the opposing ‘other’ (Duijzings 2000, 157). All the while, 
churches and mosques became the major targets of destruction and embodied the emerging divisions.  
For many, these events recalled a historical process of ethno-religious imbroglio among and 
between the states that carved their independent statehood out of former Ottoman territories in the 
Balkans. Centuries of Ottoman rule, and its millet system of organization, whereby religion was used 
to define separate identities, nurtured a strong sense of in-group belonging, determined almost 
exclusively by religion (Poulton and Taji-Farouki 1997). The weakening of the Empire in the 19
th
 
paved the way for competing European concepts of modern state organization and authority. But even 
where religious divisions were eroded by competing sources of identification, institutional legacies, 
group allegiances and daily practices at the local level helped to preserve a sense of distinct faith-
based communities, which continued to separate and undermine the aspiring national units.  
In the age of nation- and state-building, these distinguishable communal identities were promoted, 
manipulated and usurped by political schemers of all sorts in order to demarcate their new nations, 
engineer homogeneity, consolidate central state authority, reconfigure borders, and, when necessary, 
wage wars against ‘others’. Modern state-making presses its subjects towards single identities: one 
cannot keep track of people who choose to be one thing at one point and something else at another. In 
the Balkans, similar to the ‘construction’ of ethno-national identities in Western Europe, ‘the self-
consistent person who “has” one “identity” is the product of a specific historical process: modern 
nation-state formation’ (Verdery 1994, 37). In this process, religion was taken out of the hands of the 
believers and subjected to various state ideologies and political projects – secularism, patriotism, 
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ethnic mobilization, national unity and centralized state authority – which had very little to do with 
faith itself. Indeed, attempts by political ‘entrepreneurs’, but also by centers of religious power, to 
agitate for the eradication of elements of blend and mixture were livelier in border and composite 
areas, where ethnic and national loyalties remained the most fluid (Duijzings 2000). 
Islam, which enjoyed particular social and legal advantages during the centuries of Pax Ottomana, 
became the very backbone of political engineering during the processes of ‘re-imaging’ national 
regimes that spun out of the dissolution of the Empire. The predominantly Christian-Orthodox Balkan 
states that gained independence in the period from 1829 to 1878 – Serbia, Greece, Romania, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria and Bosnia – all identified themselves with the orthodox ‘millet’ in order to 
consolidate their newly-won statehood (Poulton and Taji-Farouki 1997, 25). Albania, which inherited 
a mixed religious population, could not clothe nationalism with a single creed, but attempted to 
promote the heterodox Bektashi order as the main religious pillar of an ‘ecumenical’ nation (Clayer 
2008). Regardless of their composition, however, all the post-Ottoman Balkan states targeted their 
Muslim populations as a leftover of the Ottoman past, almost a traitor in the midst of their nations in 
the making (Katsikas 2009, 539). Such nation- and state-building strategies informed a wide range of 
anti-Muslim policies: foreigners to be expelled; stigmatization vis-à-vis the dominant ethno-religious 
group; measures of homogenization; and, at best toleration as separate ethno-religious groups. Muslim 
communities, for their part, had to carve a new place for themselves amidst non-Muslim societies, 
exclusive nation-building projects, antagonistic policies, and shifting fortunes of the European 
geopolitical order.  
The State-Organized Religious ‘Field’: Continuous Legacies, Static Categories and 
Transmission Mechanisms 
Re-awakened nationalisms of the 1990s, and new politics of identity and statehood, which were 
certainly suffused with old ethno-religious symbolisms, informed similar readings of Islam also after 
the fall of Communism. To quote the findings of a recent study, ‘the interpretation of … Muslim 
politics as trapped in the politics of identity and inter-communal ethno-religious nationalism prevails 
in the media, political debates and international community’s projects as well as in academic 
discourses’ (Henig and Bielenin-Lenczowska 2013, 2). Violence played a crucial role in solidifying 
exclusivist national projects: ‘it makes reality resemble the ideological constructs that underpin the 
violence’ (Duijzings 2000, 33). Hence, during and for some time after the Balkan conflicts, the 
analysis of the Islamic phenomena was left at the tender mercy of nationalism and post-conflict 
studies, which re-interpreted religion in line with ethno-religious splits and static national categories.  
The inbuilt divisions also carried the active contribution of political elites to ‘nationalize’ but also 
‘centralize’ and ‘manage’ newborn Islamic impulses within the unitary frame of the state authority. 
Policies of nationalization-cum-etatization of Islam often served worldly interests of subjecting 
religion to the service of concrete political projects and agendas (Hann and Pelkmans 2009, 1520). All 
modern states maintain boundaries by mastering criteria for inclusion and exclusion, but this was 
especially pertinent in light of the centralized legacy of the post-Communist state apparatus. Former 
Communist regimes had built up a highly centralized machinery to appropriate and control all spheres 
of life, including public religions and intimate spheres of personal piety. Succeeding post-Communist 
entities capitalized on the power of the state machinery to construct, select and also use religious 
symbols as an anchor of political legitimacy. Institutionally, the state continued to monitor nations’ 
religious life by preserving a multi-tiered system of registration, screening and controls (Stan and 
Turcescu 2011). Although the management of Islam depended upon the demographic and historical 
particularities of each entity, the use of states’ muscles to discipline it remained the same. Communist-
style centralization and modernization thus bequeathed vestiges of largely interventionist and 
occasionally hostile state policies to the post-Communist institutional models of managing Islam. 
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At the same time, some of the Communist ideological templates could spill over into post-
Communist arrangements to ‘check Islam at the door’ of the succeeding nation-states. Former state 
intelligentsias – historians, linguists, ethnographers, writers, artists and students of Marxist ideology – 
supported by an overstaffed academy and generously funded by the Communist regime worked as 
active transmission mechanisms of former Communist ideas. The previous regime prepared and made 
use of state intelligentsias in order to articulate the nation’s ‘heritage’, complete with a pantheon of 
great thinkers, artists, writers and heroes. After the regime change in the 1990s, these intellectuals took 
up key positions in the new machinery of the reproduction of knowledge –education ministries, 
academic institutions, universities and publishing outlets – generating what Gellner has dubbed the 
‘diffusion of a school-mediated, academy supervised [national] idiom’ (1983, 140). In the new 
spectrum of revived nationalisms, Muslims were commonly seen as some kind of ethnic ‘fifth 
column’, remnants of a bygone era, which could never be integrated successfully into the planned 
homogenous, modern, European, and often exclusively Orthodox nation-states. Consequently, any 
expressions of Islam had to be oppressed, kept out of the public realm or placed under state 
surveillance. Such accounts of nations’ ‘heritage’ and related versions of history enforced stagnant 
parameters on how the nation, state and Islam merged and parted ways in the collective official 
memory of each political entity.  
Government-sponsored ‘official’ Islam – an organizational concept, which refers to the creation of 
centralized religious hierarchies approved by the state – serves as yet another powerful interlocutor of 
transmitting politically-conceived top-down national accounts of Islam (Bringa 1995, 199; Oktem 
2011, 162-3). Headed by a Chief Mufti, governed by formal statutes, and supported and monitored by 
the state, central hierarchies are acknowledged as the sole authority governing the respective ‘national’ 
community of believers all across the Balkans. Even where pragmatic interests or ideological rifts 
divided official Islamic structures, the post-Communist state made sure to remedy the problems and 
affirm its selected interlocutors. The official hierarchy, in return, helped to establish state oversight 
over the community of believers and to cleanse ‘undesirable’ influences (Ghodsee 2010, 19; Elbasani 
2015). By offering particular benefits and co-opting the Islamic ‘establishment’, the post-Communist 
states continued to maintain an intricate relationship between political and Islamic structures – the 
sovereign has the prerogative of control and intervention, Ulamas are domesticated, religious ideas 
tamed, and scholarship corrected. Central structures are consequently relegated to a subordinate 
political role, remarkable for their support of government policies.  
It is through this coalition of ‘the powerful’, supported by the backing of state institutions, that top-
down political constructs of nation, history, past and present are perpetrated and reinforced in each 
country. These structures necessarily maintain and reproduce inflexible ‘boundary-drawing’ categories 
on and within Islam itself. All the while, believers’ recovery of piety and observance, as well as 
referents of faith, is filtered through the ethno-national categories that nourish the state-organized 
religious ‘fields’.  
New Encounters of Faith: Believers, Choices and Diversity 
The assumption of clear-cut ethno-religious identities and functions, which frame the politically 
regulated religious ‘field’, however, represents a straitjacket for the purpose of exploring believers’ 
manifold discoveries of faith after Communism. The top-down assignment of uniform collective 
identities and terms of belonging in the process of nation-states’ imposed uniformity is one account of 
the post-Communist trajectory of faith. Another account is believers’ own individual searches and 
pursuits of various ‘identities’ on offer during the opening up of the religious space. The two levels are 
interrelated. Believers respond to the broad socio-political currents, which affect their personal and 
communal lives. Enrolment within communal boundaries becomes particularly strong during radical 
periods of war, violence and religious marginalization, which force believers to choose where they 
belong and to stick together.  
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Still, the faithful are active agents with the capacity to choose and reinvent the ethno-national 
classificatory systems within which they manoeuvre. Rituals and living practices often function as a 
means of de-authorising hegemonic ‘national’ perspectives that privilege selected memories and 
collective identities (Creed 2011). Believers, moreover, encounter different sources of identification, 
and actively select and weigh the value of each according to the surrounding circumstances and 
personal experiences. Mixed ‘identities’ are frequent, particularly in peripheral settings where 
ecclesiastical organizations and state institutions are less powerful in terms of how they reach and 
determine believers’ preferences. Hence, the more one moves out of and away from centrally 
controlled religious machinery, the more one observes Muslim ‘anomalies’ – ethno-religious fusion, 
heterodox practices, cultural diffusion and plural forms of belonging and believing (Bringa 1995; 
Ghodsee 2010; Henig and Bielenin-Lenczowska 2013). As Duijzings puts it: ‘there is always friction 
between the ideal ethno-religious models or ideologies produced by states and religious regimes, and 
the social reality to which they refer’ (2000, 25). Seen from the autonomous spaces of believers’ 
choices, practice and piety, ‘being Muslim’ takes multiple forms across different localities and 
moments of transition.  
The post-Communist open market of religiosity has further expanded the scope of ‘identity’ offers 
available to Muslim believers. At least three crucial developments here – namely 1) the phenomena of 
post-socialist secularization; 2) incoming international influences; and 3) the ‘EU-ization’ of the 
religious sphere – contribute to challenging and reconfiguring the one-size-fits-all ethno-national 
formulas into which Muslims are commonly squeezed. These breaks in the organized religious field 
confront Muslim believers with different, sometimes contradictory and sometimes competing sources 
of influence, both internal and foreign, regional and global, formal and informal, secular and sacred. 
The Imprint of Secularization 
The Communist-style modernization, and the eviction of religion from the public arena, has 
contributed to a certain ‘secularization of Balkan societies’ and ‘a sharp decline in religious practice’ 
(Bougarel 2005, 11). Region-wide polls show that an absolute majority of people declare that they 
believe in God and belong to one of the religious communities, but much fewer attend communal 
services or enroll in established structures (University of Oslo 2011). Specific data on Muslims 
similarly shows that the majority prefer to attend only important ceremonies at poignant moments in 
life such as birth, wedding and funerals. Muslim believers also appear strongly committed in confining 
religion to the private sphere – away from institutions, schools, arts and the public sphere more 
generally (ibid; Oktem 2011). Even when the struggle for nation and statehood strengthened Muslims’ 
identification with the core ethno-national group, their allegiances did not result in a holistic 
Islamization of their identities, be it in the sense of uniform practices, regular attendance of communal 
services, discovery of a global religious Umma, and/or unquestioned loyalty to the doctrine of the 
organized religious establishment.  
International Influences 
Another trend, which destabilizes the nationally-organized religious field, and surfs the wave of de-
institutionalized religious choices, come with the intrusion of various external influences in the porous 
institutional order that characterized the collapse of Communism. The liberalization of religious 
conduct and the opening of new channels of communication with the world allowed for the creation of 
a vivid and competitive ‘marketplace’, where foreign actors, structures and ideas – missionaries, 
migrants, students from abroad, humanitarian organizations and virtual Internet networks – compete 
with established institutions and national ideologies for market ‘shares’ (Elbasani 2015; Tziampiris 
2009; Karcic 2010). Cash-rich Saudi organizations, but also a myriad of other Middle Eastern and 
Turkish organizations, targeted Muslim communities in the Balkans in order to win post-atheist souls 
and gain a foothold in the midst of Europe. Well-funded Islamic networks provided necessary 
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financial resources for the recovery of faith: funds for the re-building of infrastructure, scholarships 
for students abroad, foreign literature, local translations, a multitude of religious missionaries, 
education networks, and expansive humanitarian assistance mixed with proselytization activities. 
Some of those associations also insisted upon propagating an Islamic message clean of local cultural 
‘impurities’. Foreign movements and their messages managed to infiltrate the central institutions, 
made inroads amongst the uprooted and the poor, attracted groups suffering the hardship of economic 
collapse, and preached a message of equality and justice amidst the corrupt post-Communist political 
order (Ghodsee 2010). Yet, the paradoxes and dilemmas that came with different global movements 
and their interpretations of Islam seemingly pushed local communities to select most convincing ideas 
and take ownership of their own way of living and practicing faith (Karic 2002; Elbasani 2015).  
The Europeanization of the Religious Space 
A third factor, which disrupts and reconfigures the organised religious field, is Muslims’ access to a 
broader European institutional and normative space, now closely related to the ongoing processes of 
EU accession. The promise of EU membership to all countries in the Balkans left out of the previous 
enlargement brought them into closer contact with the European project, and exposed them to Europe-
wide debates on what it is to be Muslim in contemporary Western Europe. EU-level debates, often 
intermingled with issues of enlargement fatigue, Christian heritage, problems of migration, issues of 
terrorism, and the uncertainty of Turkey’s accession, add pressure on Muslim believers to position 
themselves along the indigenous side of ‘European Islam’. The term reflects Muslims’ long-term 
historical engagement with institutional templates and ideological frames emanating from the 
European continent (Clayer and Germain 2008). Yet, in the post-Communist era, the term ‘European 
Muslim’ is now employed to suggest their active support for the post-1989 project of ‘return’ to 
Europe and the concrete criteria of EU accession – democracy, the rule of law and market economy –
with which candidate countries are required to comply (Elbasani 2013).  
At the same time, Muslims perceive the EU-level institutions and equal rights of citizenship as an 
international layer of protection against restrictive national policies and ideologies (Elbasani and 
Saatçioğlu 2014). All across the Balkans, Muslims have discovered that the EU’s democratic 
requirements expand the range of religious rights and claims that they can make in the public sphere 
(Ghodsee 2010, 177). Different Muslim associations and groups have mobilized the EU’s norms and 
values associated with the highest standards of democracy – freedom of speech, opinion, conscience, 
property, and minority protection – to broaden their claims in the domestic arena.  
Alternative Discoveries of God  
The post-Communist ‘disruptions’ of the religious field have unleashed a myriad of new actors with 
various solutions and alternatives concerning the revival of faith: 1) state authorities, 2) official 
Islamic institutions, and 3) local actors including lay believers and informal authorities. It all depends 
on who speaks for Islam.  
Protective Nationalisms: Extolling Endogenous versus Foreign Islam 
State authorities and official Islamic institutions often ally together to protect the official traditional 
line and consequently portray competing forms of revival of faith as ‘foreign’ and alien to the ideas of 
national identity, thus antagonizing many ‘born-again’ Muslims. Ambivalence towards Islam is a 
recurrent and structurally inbuilt feature of old and new Balkan nationalisms, but it has reappeared in 
full force in the post-Communist re-imagination of the religious sphere. Balkan polities, at least at the 
macro-political level, continue to share the common assumption that Islam is a problematic leftover 
and the disputed ‘other’ amidst their European states in the making. Accordingly, Islam requires state 
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control and conjectural reformation in order to ‘fit’ the given ethno-religious composition of 
respective nation-states.  
The political and academic entrepreneurs that ‘guard’ the nations also keep defining the borders of 
acceptable ‘traditional’ Islam(s), typically framed in the context of a nation’s cultural and historical 
particularities. Expressions of faith that do not fit into this ‘fabric’ are exposed to misnomers ranging 
from enemies of the nation to remnants of a bygone era, to odious renegades and foreign agents. The 
bifurcation between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, local and foreign, national and global, and ultimately, good 
and bad Islam(s) capitalizes on nation-based categories. Accordingly, national traditional Islam is 
portrayed as a ‘moderate’ – liberal, tolerant, indigenous and European version, whereas global or 
foreign Islam is perceived as alien, fundamentalist, and possibly intolerant and radical. Traditional 
Islam, moreover, is presented as being ‘embedded’ within a local culture, which borrows syncretic 
elements from other religions such as Bektashism, Sufism and local folk traditions (Roy 2015).  
Within the exclusive nationalist accounts, the revival of Islam and changes in religious practices 
and beliefs are often linked to foreign influences that penetrated the Balkans after the post-Communist 
liberalization of religious conduct in the 1990s. In Albania, mainstream public intellectuals 
problematize the revival of Islamic practices by employing orientalist stereotypes that juxtapose 
Albanians’ broad brush religious-free European identity with the imported ‘backward’ trends of Islam 
(Sulstarova 2015). The ‘pronounced’ forms of religious practices are commonly exteriorized. As one 
of Tošić’s informants puts it, ‘this is foreign to us. It comes from Saudi Arabia and there is money 
involved! We are Europeans. We do not need this here!’ (2015). The contrast between local European 
strains of Islam and imported extremist currents sparks intensive debates on revival of Islam also in 
Bosnia (Mesarič 2015). Here, Salafism and its expressions are similarly deemed as practices 
‘incompatible with Bosnian-cum-European culture’. In the same vein of argument, Olson’s 
ethnographic work in Bulgaria suggests that both the government and the media propagate the 
Orientalist myth that ‘Islamic revival has been imported wholesale from the Middle East, through the 
efforts of Arab organizations with ties to terrorism’ (2015). By ‘externalizing’ the revival of Islam, 
Balkan states look down upon newly practicing Muslims as some kind of ‘imported’ or externally 
transplanted faith community, which undermines the ‘endogenous’ traditional features of the nation 
established over centuries (Roy 2015). 
Foreign Islamic movements, for their part, are also divided into two main trends namely: 1) 
Salafism, either in an institutional form, largely sponsored by Saudi Arabia, or in a de-institutionalized 
form, driven by informal networks, including individual imams and militant missionaries; and 2) the 
neo-Ottoman model, sponsored by Turkish official state structures (Diyanet) or non-official 
institutions such as the Gülen networks. These ‘interferences’ play out at the macro-political level and 
manifest themselves in the grandiose form of national identity, ‘threats’, but also regional shifts of 
power and clashes of civilization. Salafi religious predicators and missionaries, militant NGOs (Gülen 
schools), or cultural or religious activities sponsored by foreign states (TİKA for Turkey, or the OIC), 
are seen as reinforcing the already existing ethno-religious divides and reshaping them into a geo-
strategic, regional, and broad civilizational confrontation (Roy 2015). Accordingly, not only the unity 
of the nation, but European ‘civilization’ itself, is at stake. In the words of one of the Metropolitans of 
the Greek Orthodox Church, 
Asian peoples invade Europe threatening to alter the synthesis of its population. After that, the 
spirit of Islam and its traditions will dominate. Within a multicultural world the winner will be 
race, the population that will dominate over the other. Now, Muslims fight to dominate 
biologically and become a majority in Europe. The shrinking of the White World has been 
prepared. Unfortunately, Europe faces a serious situation. (Quoted in Sakellariou 2015)  
Political and intellectual elites all across the Balkans have proved quite receptive of the thesis of a 
‘civilizational’ divide between the East and the West, and the contested role of Islam in its midst. 
Highly acclaimed intellectuals in Albania, for example, all ponder on the obstacles that Islam poses in 
their country’s path towards Europe and frame the issue as a choice between East and West 
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(Sulstarova 2015). In Kosovo too, political elites seek to distance the fragile state structure from any 
identification with the Islamic majority by downplaying its institutions and symbols (Mehmeti 2015). 
Both countries have devised a similar policy of ‘detaching’ Islam from the aspired ‘European’ national 
identity and the consensual Post-Communist political project of a ‘return’ to Europe. 
The chains of transmission work top-down – political elites and state bureaucrats establish the 
broad institutional confines, intellectual circles supply suitable historical narratives, and official 
religious hierarchies diffuse the official line across their respective community of believers. Official 
Muslim organizations, each based near centres of political power in Sarajevo, Prishtina, Tirana, 
Skopje, Sofia and so on, maintain organizational devices – the faculty of Islamic Studies, a network of 
Madrasas, as well as intellectual, publication and humanitarian activity nets – that distribute the 
national/traditional vision of Islam. The central hierarchies, moreover, paradoxically support a strong 
separation of ‘Church’ and State, indeed a fundamental feature of ‘traditional’ Islam(s) across the 
Balkans. The Islamic Community in Bosnia, for example, ascribes to itself the role of protecting and 
following the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks. A resolution passed in 2006 obliges the community to 
protect ‘the authenticity of the centuries old tradition,’ and requires imams to take account of the 
‘Bosnian tradition’ when interpreting Islam (Mesarič 2015). The Grand Mufti and his representatives 
in Bulgaria follow a similar line of Islam that is strongly rooted in the fabric of Bulgarian local culture 
and European ‘belonging’ (Olson 2015). Pursuing the ‘tradition’ is also the foremost goal of the 
Central Sunni Organization in Albania, which describes itself as an ‘engine in the promotion of 
highest Islamic and patriotic values’ while pledging to ‘develop a feeling of love and faithfulness for 
the religion and the Fatherland’ (Endresen 2015). Concurrently with the political project and its 
European orientation, the Albanian Muslim hierarchy describes the country as one of a ‘Muslim 
majority’, but with a ‘Western spirit’, a ‘Western vocation’ and ‘Western ethnic origins’ (Ibid.).  
Believers’ Choices and Communities of Faith 
Opposing local traditional Islam to foreign Islam, however, misses the emerging reconfigurations and 
the in-situ evolution of autonomous ‘faith communities’, where members of the ethno-national groups 
or sub-groups endeavour to build a community of believers within a larger group of ‘cultural 
Muslims’. Most believers understand Islam as a religion and not as a culture; they are local pious 
people who organize meetings, prayers and classes without seeking any form of institutionalisation or 
authority (Roy 2015). They do not necessarily reject the concept of local Muslim culture, they do not 
consider less observant neighbours as ‘infidels’, they just want to ‘purify’ and specify the religious 
norms. They want to define a religious attitude towards the world that does not consist of merely 
‘belonging’ to a cultural group, but rather of freely incorporating religious norms and values into their 
daily life and practice.  
Funk’s analysis of Friday prayer and the wearing of the hijab in Bosnia show that believers 
frequently avail to their right of choice. As one of her interlocutors puts it ‘in Bosnia nothing seems to 
be farz, an obligation by God... we somehow choose everything. It is an obligation but we do it as our 
free choice’ (Funk 2015). Believers’ resort to choice is particularly visible in the donning of the hijab. 
Olson’s study of informal teachers of Islam in Bulgarian villages shows that some of them advocate 
individual choice:  
Everyone has the right to choose. A girl who dresses like that [in dark colors] is saying, ‘I want to 
dress like this!’ Do you understand? But there are very modern [Muslim girls, women] – they put 
on a headscarf, they wear pants and for example a tight shirt, which absolutely is not a problem. 
(Olson 2015)  
The younger generation of covered women in Bosnia has indeed been quite innovative in wearing the 
hijab and showing that veiled women ‘can be nicely and fashionably dressed’ (Mesarič 2015). Where 
believers are deprived of the right to wear the headscarf, as in the case of Kosovo, they consider it a 
matter of individual and religious freedom and urge their elites to look ‘to Europe and the rights 
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enjoyed by Muslims there’ (Sadriu 2015). The reverse, however, can also be true in the discourse of 
Imams that propagate for the ‘purification’ of Islam from local influences. As a Saudi-educated Imam 
in Bulgaria instructs his followers, the ‘West’ uses different ways to ‘ruin’ Muslim women:  
Television (especially soap operas and advertisements which showed partially naked 
women); education (especially sending one's daughter abroad to study); celebration of 
‘others’ holidays’ in school (such as Christmas); graduation ceremonies; promotion of 
‘ruined women’ (pop singers) as the ‘stars of Bulgaria’ (a marketing campaign by one of 
Bulgaria's most prominent music labels, Payner); and beauty parlors. (Olson 2015) 
This variety of actors are not insulated bearers of tradition and national ideologies: they have access to 
the Internet and to international publications; they might go abroad to study, or make pilgrimages, 
attend conferences, follow online sermons and fatwas, et cetera. They also assemble into pious 
communities that strive for a fusion between religion and rights, faith and identity, practices and 
knowledge. Their array of personal choices develops at the intersection between national traditions, 
newly-won freedoms, global influences and access to European institutions and rights. Channels of 
communication with the world allow Muslim leaders and their constituents to ‘learn’ Islam in an open 
and personal way using top-down vertical but also horizontal social networks of transmission. The 
Internet, particularly, represents a conventional, easy-to-use, tool for them to access new sources of 
information and knowledge. As a believer, who considers himself in the process of ‘learning’ assesses: 
‘With the opening of Albania, also the religion came here … you accept and step by step you may 
arrive at some point, … we are learning the religion at the moment, we are at the start of learning.’ 
(Tošić 2015). The expansion of piety movements which are embracing a new kind of Islamic 
knowledge and experience demonstrates that believers rely on non-traditional channels – informal 
meetings, multiple authorities and alternative sources including open debates as much as authenticated 
textual sources – to learn about Islam (Olson 2015; Mesarič 2015). In the context of the open and 
competitive market of religiosity, believers seek new knowledge and sources of information. As a 
pious Muslim women from Bosnia puts it: ‘ If you want to learn about Islam at the mosque, the hodža 
(imam) will only speak to you during Ramadan, and if he happens to be ill, not even then. And on top 
of that, he repeats the same thing every year. …I want more.’ (Mesarič 2015)  
It is usually through new non-official channels of learning that believers can discover Islam beyond 
official traditional dogmas and broad frames of nationally organized religious fields. Tradition as a 
collection of local beliefs and customs that is shared across generations, however, is sticky and 
remains a crucial point of reference through which believers make sense of the incoming ideas and 
alternative sources of knowledge. As a study on marriage preferences among Macedonian speaking 
Muslims shows, they tend to consider outsiders as ‘different from our Muslims, having different 
culture, customs and tradition.’ (Zadrożna 2015). Local culture, and what it connotes for family 
models and gender roles, accordingly, determines Muslims’ crucial life choices such as marriage and 
love relations, even if they tend to venture into illicit romances when living abroad. The study of 
forms of pilgrimage and the cults of saints among Muslim Roma communities similarly shows the 
stickiness of tradition, which combines a layer of pre-existing Islamic rites, Sufi practices and popular 
beliefs (Trofimova 2015). Such rituals survive and get a life of their own even if they stand in stark 
contrast to the teachings of the official Islamic hierarchies, which for their part strive to free the local 
habitus from ‘elements of ignorance and innovation.’ (Ibid.)  
Whereas communities of the faithful diffract from traditional knowledge supplied by official 
organizations, they also screen, select and resist non-official sources of religious knowledge and 
practice. Not all knowledge, ideas, and missionary activities and networks that permeated the Balkans 
during the post-Communist openings are similarly welcomed by local populations. To paraphrase the 
concerns of a Muslim believer from Bosnia:  
In the war and after the war, a lot of people started to go to mosque or to church here. The “need 
for God” was on such a high level. In [those]… extreme conditions and dangerous circumstances, 
after a sort of atheistic communism, it is very normal to try to find an “exit” in religion/s. … I was 
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just afraid that my good friend… [would accept] an extreme… interpretation of Islam….’ (Funk 
2015).  
Resistance against radical movements and doctrines has been the main thread of centralized 
hierarchies’ advocacy of traditional knowledge and their monopoly of knowledge. Yet, Salafi and 
other radical forms of Islamism have achieved limited gains also amongst lay believers and 
autonomous communities that resort to ideas different from the traditionally-packaged ones (Bougarel 
2005). Both official hierarchies and decentralized communities of the faithful have seemingly resorted 
to different aspects of ‘tradition’ – the body of institutional solutions, arguments and practices 
inherited from the past – to juxtapose radical projects and re-cast Islam in line with new democratic 
and European aspirations of their post-Communist polities (Elbasani 2015).  
The diffracted picture of Islamic actors and alternatives shows that the contemporary religious 
‘breaks’ in the organized religious fields inform the development of more personalized and individual 
attitudes towards religion and organised official schemes. In the context of the open market of 
religiosity, the Islamic ‘community’ appears scattered, heterogeneous and not particularly concerned 
with unifying itself or even being represented (Roy 2007, 68-9). Newfound religiosities involve 
autonomous ‘pick and choose’ discoveries of faith. Although lay Muslims operate and locate 
themselves within the familiar tradition, much as their official counterparts, they also keep learning 
faith from alternative sources and channels of information. All the while, the Islamic phenomenon is 
no longer only the bearer of ethno-national alternatives and politically assigned prescriptions, but also 
the symptom of new spaces that cannot be confined within a particular state, nation territory, or 
ethnicity.  
Conclusions  
This article investigated the variety of actors that speak for Islam and their alternatives in the context 
of the open market of religion, and contemporary disruptions of organized religious ‘fields’, across the 
post-Communist Balkans. In particular, the article shifted the analytical focus from the top-down 
dominant macro-political debates that connect nation, state and religion to the multitude of Muslim 
actors, their choices and alternative expressions of faith. Similarly to other cases and contexts, revived 
post-Communist believers seek to define a religious attitude towards the world and endeavour to recast 
Islam beyond traditional dogmas or official suppliers of knowledge. Muslims’ discovery of faith 
amidst alternative channels and sources of knowledge has contributed to recasting the relationship 
between nation, state and faith. It has also reconfigured, and in a way detached, the close links 
between religion – as a coherent corpus of beliefs managed by a body of legitimate holders of 
knowledge – and religiosity as individual believers’ own formulations and experiences of faith (Roy 
2007, 7-8).  
Our analysis of the revival of Islam in the Balkans shows a clear bifurcation between state-
organized religion with its own actors, ideas and mechanisms of diffusion on the one hand; and 
believers’ autonomous choices, experiences and congregation into pious communities on the other. 
State authorities and religious hierarchies responsible for ‘guarding’ the nation and its underlying 
traditions, for their part, extoll the differences between ‘good’ traditional or cultural Islam and ‘bad’ 
pronounced foreign imports. They continue to perform checks of ‘authentic’ and ‘genuine’ Islamic 
traditions in the interest of nations’ homogeneity and precise criteria for inclusion and exclusion. From 
an official perspective, the revival of Islam is read through ‘our’ tradition and is seen as reinforcing 
identity, even civilizational, conflicts between the national ‘us’ and incoming ‘others’. Lay believers, 
for their part, seemingly congregate into autonomous groups that strive to discover and practice Islam 
as faith, and not as culture, tradition, or an ethno-religious collective category. They avail of their 
freedom of choice and benefit from new channels of information as well as familiar traditional sources 
and practices, in taking ownership of their own ‘ways’ of being Muslim. Hence, Islam, as framed at 
the top-down political level, remains an important marker of identities, but the experience of 
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religiosity has increasingly become a more personalized individual attitude, detached from official 
structures and prescriptions. If there is a common finding amongst the alternative routes to religiosity 
explained here, it is that believers’ practice and pursuit of Islam are increasingly personalized, mobile, 
weakly institutionalized, and collective as a choice. 
The ‘de-nationalization’ and ‘de-ethnization’ of Islam does not necessarily entail ‘de-culturation,’ 
but rather the recasting of the connection between religious, cultural and political markers; it opens up 
the ‘religious sphere’, by making faith a choice, a set of personal beliefs distinct from the traditional 
body of knowledge (Roy 2015). If there is any ‘religious revival,’ moreover, it is not working in 
favour of any kind of pan-Islamism or even uniform religious revival. It simply contributes to making 
religion more autonomous politically, institutionally and ideologically. The result is the recasting of 
Islam as a religion, not as a collective and organized structure of ‘belonging’. Overall, our analysis 
suggests the articulation of different pathways to God and maps the array of local actors and 
mechanism that reconstitute the presumed link between nation, state and Islam in the post-Communist 
era. At a more general level, these findings contribute to broader and timely theoretical questions on 
the actors that speak for Islam, the role of foreign influences, the dynamic relationship between nation, 
state and faith, the post-Communist forms of religiosities, as well as the traits of Islam in the larger 
European context.  
What is interesting, and in need of further research here, is to explore why both the political 
guardians of the nation and pious believers across the Balkans make use of similar traditional sources 
and embrace local solutions when recasting Islam. Political elites, intellectuals and lay Muslims in the 
region have long sought answers on the most appropriate forms of organization, articulation and 
public expressions of Islam in the context of modern and secular European ‘civilization’. However, 
future research needs to further inquire into how inherited solutions, arguments and practices inform 
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